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Abstract We apply a probabilistic approach to the evaluation of climate change impacts in
Mozambique. We pass a distribution of climate shocks through a series of structural
biophysical models. The resulting joint distributions of biophysical outcomes are then
imposed on a dynamic economywide model. This framework produces distributions of
economic impacts of climate change thus identifying an explicit range of potential economic
outcomes and associating probability levels with given sets of outcomes. For example, we
find that the economy of Mozambique may be up to 13 % smaller in 2050 compared with a
fictional no climate change scenario (and assuming global policy fails to constrain emissions
growth). The probability of gross domestic product (GDP) declines of greater than 10 % is
relatively small at 2.5 %. These large declines are principally the result of dramatic
reductions in flood return periods. To 2050, about 70 % of future climates result in GDP
losses of between zero and five percent. In about 9 % of cases, climate change shocks result
in higher GDP outcomes. We conclude that, relative to current practice, this structural
probabilistic approach provides (i) significantly more information to decision-makers, (ii)
more detailed insight into the importance of various impact channels, and (iii) a more holistic
and comprehensive approach for evaluating adaptation options.
1 Introduction
In this special issue, a series of articles have addressed a range of important aspects of climate
change including implications for crop production, runoff, irrigation demand, flood frequency
and intensity, road infrastructure, hydropower, and the combination of sea level rise and
cyclone strike. This article aggregates the biophysical outcomes from the preceding articles
in order to estimate the implications of climate change for economic growth and development
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prospects. In so doing, correlations across impacts are captured. For example, relatively dry
climate scenarios may have negative implications for crop and hydropower production but
may also reduce costs of maintaining road networks. We focus on Mozambique, which is a
representative country within the Zambezi River Valley and is also reasonably typical of low-
income agrarian economies in Sub-Saharan Africa.
To do this, we employ a dynamic economywide model with substantial sectoral detail
calibrated to a detailed snapshot of the Mozambican economy in 2007. The inputs into the
economywide model arrive in the form of distributions of annual weather shocks driven by a
hybrid frequency distribution (HFD) of 6800 possible future climate outcomes (Schlosser and
Strzepek 2013) summarized to 426 representative future climates using the approach described
by Arndt et al. (2014). These 426 climates are designed to represent the best possible
approximation to the distribution of future climates given the information available today
and under the assumption that global mitigation policy regimes fail to constrain emissions
growth. With a distribution of biophysical impacts driven by climate variations, the
economywide model generates distributions of economic outcomes. For example, we estimate
the HFD of average gross domestic product (GDP) levels relative to a hypothetical “no climate
change” baseline, where historical climate patterns simply repeat themselves.
The estimation of HFDs on outcomes, in our view, productively shifts the terms of the
debate. Suppose that we define the impacts of climate change as being “substantial” if they
result in a greater than 10 % reduction in GDP by 2050 relative to a “no climate change”
baseline. An earlier study for Mozambique, using four future climate scenarios, indicated that
this is possible (Arndt et al. 2011). Our analysis, based on 426 future climates and more refined
versions of the biophysical and economic models, indicates that these outcomes are possible
but unlikely. Specifically, our model results indicate that the probability of a reduction in GDP
of greater than 10 % is about 2.5 %, or the chances are about one in 40. Attaching probabilities
to the range of economic outcomes from climate change provides a more robust empirical
basis for evaluating the opportunity costs of adaptation investments.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the economic
structure of Mozambique and briefly describes the economywide model employed for the
economic impact analysis. Section 3 discusses the shocks drawn from the preceding articles in
this volume, focusing on the case without global climate policy (i.e., the unconstrained
emissions scenario). Section 4 presents results with a focus on impacts on the level of real
GDP around 2050, and the net present value (NPV) of GDP losses (or gains) to 2050. The
structural approach employed allows us to decompose the growth and NPV effects by impact
channel and through time. The final section concludes that the probabilistic approach
employed offers at least three distinct advantages relative to current practice where a limited
number of climate scenarios are analyzed.
2 Economic structure and model
2.1 Economic structure
Table 1 summarizes Mozambique’s trade and production structure in 2007, which is the base
year for our analysis. At market exchange rates prevailing in 2007, Mozambican GDP
amounted to almost nine billion US dollars (USD). Dividing this by a population of about
21 million yields per capita GDP of about USD420 per annum or somewhat more than one
USD per person per day. However, incomes are not distributed evenly throughout the
population. About 70 % of the population is rural and 80 % depend upon agriculture for their
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livelihood. Despite this high concentration of employment, the agricultural sector (i.e., crops,
livestock, forestry and fishing) generates only 28 % of value-added. Low average productivity
in agriculture, combined with a lack of employment opportunities in non-agricultural sectors
for low skilled labor, implies low incomes and high levels of poverty for most of the
population.
Other salient features of Mozambique include a high dependence on metals exports,
particularly aluminum, which is largely an enclave activity with few linkages to other sectors.
Electricity, most of which is from hydropower, is also a major sector and a significant source of
foreign exchange. As part of the Southern African Power Pool, Mozambique is both an
importer and exporter of electricity. Importantly, petroleum represents a major import item at
about 14 % of total imports. In addition, many other chemical imports contain items with high
petroleum content, e.g., fertilizers and plastics. This dependence on imported petroleum is a
typical feature of poor African economies. Unlike petroleum, Mozambique’s agricultural trade
is more balanced, with a deficit of only 1.6 % of GDP. Finally, the country covers a large
geographic area and so trade and transport services also represent a substantial share of value-
added. Overall, Mozambique’s economic structure in 2007 is fairly typical of low-income
African economies.1
Table 1 Mozambique’s production and trade structure, 2007





Total economy 100 100 86.1 18.9 26.0
Agriculture 27.7 10.1 7.8 7.7 10.3
Crops 20.5 5.8 7.6 5.8 13.4
Livestock 2.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.5
Forestry 3.3 1.0 0.0 6.7 0.0
Fisheries 1.8 3.3 0.0 28.1 0.0
Mining 1.6 9.6 1.5 95.4 75.5
Manufacturing 15.4 57.2 56.5 36.9 45.5
Foods 4.2 3.1 12.8 3.5 21.1
Metals 7.4 50.7 2.2 100.0 99.3
Petroleum 0.0 0.0 13.9 0.0 100.0
Electricity and water 5.9 9.7 4.4 36.8 24.9
Construction 3.1 0.6 1.6 2.5 7.6
Services 46.4 13.4 20.6 5.6 10.2
Trade 16.8 5.8 0.0 9.0 0.0
Transport 9.8 5.2 8.8 7.5 14.9
Government 9.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
2007 Mozambique social accounting matrix
1 It has recently become clear that Mozambique possesses substantial natural resources. As the focus of this
analysis is on climate change impacts under the assumption of unconstrained emissions, we opt to avoid the
complications of projecting the impacts of natural resource exploitation. Instead, we assume that net foreign
resource availability from aid, natural resource rents, or other capital inflows grows from a bit more than USD 1
billion to about USD3 billion in real terms by 2050.
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2.2 Economywide model
The impact of climate change is simulated using a dynamic computable general equilibrium
(CGE) model. These models have features making them suitable for this analysis. First, they
simulate the functioning of a market economy, including markets for labor, capital and
commodities. Second, the structural nature of these models permits consideration of new
phenomena, such as climate change. Changes in economic conditions are mediated through
prices and markets allowing for a degree of endogenous adaptation. For example, if dryer
conditions result in reduced hydropower exports, the real exchange rate will adjust in order to
conserve foreign exchange by reducing imports and generate foreign exchange by increasing
exports from other sectors. Third, these models assure that all economywide constraints are
respected. This is critical discipline for long run projections such as those necessary for climate
change. Finally, CGE models contain detailed sector breakdowns and provide a “simulation
laboratory” for quantitatively examining how various impact channels influence the perfor-
mance and structure of the economy.
The Mozambique CGE model contains 31 commodities and four regions (North, Center,
South and an urban zone). Production from 10 agricultural activities is divided by region. This
is important for analysis of climate change as, for example, growing conditions might improve
(deteriorate) in the South while deteriorating (improving) in the North. Non-agricultural
activities map one-to-one to non-agricultural commodities and are assumed to be produced
in the single urban zone. There are four primary product processing activities that capture
linkages between primary product production and related manufacturing. Seven basic factors
of production are identified: four types of labor (uneducated and those with primary, second-
ary, and tertiary levels of education), agricultural land, livestock and capital. The land and
livestock are distributed across the three regions of Mozambique (North, Center and South).
This detail captures Mozambique’s economic structure and influences model results.
Climate change is expected to have implications within specific years (e.g., a higher
frequency of severe drought) and over time largely through influence on accumulation
processes for capital and technology. To capture these accumulation processes, a recursive
dynamic specification is adopted whereby, among other growth processes, savings and
investment in year t determines the availability of new productive capital in year t+1. The
model is solved annually over the 43-year simulation period 2007–2050. In addition, a road
infrastructure module is incorporated directly into the CGE model. This roads module
explicitly accounts for the accumulation of capital in the form of a road network
(Chinowsky et al. 2013 and Arndt et al. 2012). Events that reduce stocks of productive assets,
such as flood events that wash away roads or cyclone strikes that destroy other capital stocks,
have the potential to materially slow overall economic growth especially if climate change
substantially augments the frequency or severity of these events.2
3 Climate change impact channels
The analysis proceeds by establishing a baseline economic scenario running to 2050 where
climate change impacts are absent. We then impose successive climate change impact chan-
nels. Four major impact channels are identified: agriculture, roads, hydropower, and the
2 For a detailed exposition of the core dynamic CGE model see Diao and Thurlow (2012) while more details on
the climate change formulations and shocks imposed can be found in Arndt and Thurlow (2013).
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combination of sea level rise and cyclone strike. We discuss the baseline and then each of the
impact channels in turn.
3.1 Baseline
The objective of the Baseline scenario is to set plausible values for general economic growth
determinants. Unless these determinants are affected by climate change, their values remain
constant across all scenarios. By holding all determinants constant, except those affected by
climate change, the implications of climate change for economic growth can be inferred.
The CGE model is solved annually over the 43-year period 2007–2050. Historical climate
variability is introduced into the baseline path by assuming that 40 years of historical annual
weather repeats itself over the period 2011 to 2050, which we take as a no climate change
scenario. These climate variations affect annual agricultural and hydropower output. In
addition, economic and climate outcomes establish a baseline level for road network
expansion out to 2050. In addition, the world price projections developed by Paltsev (2012)
are incorporated into the baseline. This is done because world price changes and climate
change will interact. For example, Paltsev projects a 23 % increase in the real price of
agricultural products by 2050 under the assumption of unconstrained emissions. With these
world price increases, the welfare implications of productivity declines in agriculture may be
magnified because the option of importing food in order to make up for these shortfalls is no
longer as attractive. In addition, petroleum prices are projected to nearly triple by 2050 under
unconstrained emissions. As noted, Mozambique, like most least developed countries, cur-
rently imports nearly all hydrocarbons consumed and hydrocarbons, particularly petroleum,
represent a substantial import item.
Other growth determinants incorporated into the baseline, but assumed to be unaffected by
climate change, include population and labor supply, improvements in national educational
attainment, and crop land expansion. These are calibrated to future projections, such as the
United Nations’ population forecasts and recent trends in crop land area. Together the baseline
assumptions result in a GDP growth rate of about 5 % per annum between 2007 and 2050. In
per capita terms, this translates to a growth rate of about 3.6 % per year. This reflects a gradual
slowing down of Mozambique’s strong economic growth over the last two decades. Moreover,
the share of crops and livestock in GDP declines in the baseline from about 23 % in 2010 to
about 10 % in 2050. This is consistent with a continuation of recent patterns of economic
growth and structural change. We consider the implications of alternative baseline assumptions
when presenting our results in the next section. Below we explain how each climate change
impact channel considered is evaluated using the CGE model.
3.2 Agriculture
In this scenario, climate shocks on crop yields are applied on an annual basis. These shocks are
derived from a process-based crop model, CliCrop, which is designed specifically for climate
change applications (Fant et al. 2012). CliCrop takes annual precipitation and temperature
from the historical series or climate change projections and converts these into annual
evapotranspiration. This is compared to potential evapotranspiration, derived using regional
soil and crop characteristics, in order to estimate how crop yields in a given year deviate from
the potential yield obtained under normal weather conditions. The estimated yield deviations
are scaled to match the yields and weather outcomes in our model’s 2007 base year.
Agricultural impacts are described in detail in Fant et al. (2013). Briefly, the majority of
climate outcomes lead to declining yields for rain-fed crops, though both positive and negative
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crop yield implications are possible for nearly all crops under alternative climate projections.
By around 2050, across all climate scenarios, yields are expected to decline by about 3–4 % on
average relative to the baseline path, although declines of greater than 10 % for some crops are
possible in specific climate scenarios.3 A recent meta-analysis of crop yield impacts in Africa
and Asia by Knox et al. (2012) provides a useful point of comparison. The estimates generated
by Fant et al. fit comfortably within the range of impacts by 2050 reported by Knox et al.
(2012). While within the range, the estimates of Fant et al. (2013) tend to be slightly more
optimistic than the median reported by Knox et al. (2012) for 2050.
Crop land and capital allocations within agriculture are determined in the CGE model on
the basis of expected yields and prices, allowing for endogenous adaptation. In each year,
climate realizations (weather) causes deviations (both positive and negative) from expected
yield levels. As with the crop model, the CGE model includes production functions for each
crop in each subnational region. The estimated annual yields from CliCrop are imposed on the
CGE model by adjusting each regional crop’s baseline level of total factor productivity (TFP).
This assumes that farm labor productivity declines alongside the land yields from
CliCrop. It is important to highlight that, in the CGE model, the baseline rate of technical
advance in agriculture is unaffected by climate change, with climate causing annual
deviations around the baseline trend. When weather conditions result in production
declines, the baseline productive capacity of the land remains unaffected. Consequently,
productivity levels are able to rebound if weather in a particular year returns to baseline conditions
(Benson and Clay 1998).
3.3 Roads
Road impact shocks are explained in detail in Chinowsky et al. (2013). Briefly, changes in
temperature, precipitation, and the frequency/severity of flooding events can have strong
impacts on road infrastructure. Events that destroy infrastructure, such as fast moving floods
across roads, tend to reduce economic growth (Noy 2009). Floods eliminate both private and
public capital. With respect to roads and in the absence of insurance mechanisms, the fiscal
budget that would have been directed towards expanding the quality and density of the
network must be redirected to replacing the infrastructure lost. The result of heightened
flood frequency/intensity is a smaller and lower quality road network.
Looking to the longer term, there is substantial evidence that road network quality can be a
significant determinant of economywide productivity growth. For example, the seminal work
of Fernald (1999) concluded that public investment, principally in roads, “contributed about
one percentage point to total factor productivity growth” (p. 620) during the period 1953–1973
in the United States. For developing countries, Arndt et al. (2012) review both the cross
country and country case literature related to road infrastructure. They conclude that the weight
of the evidence points to reasonably strong externalities in terms of productivity growth from
expansion of road networks in terms of quality and quantity.
Alongside agriculture, Fant et al. (2013) employ the CliRun model in order to convert
changes in temperature and precipitation into changes in runoff and flood return periods. They
find that, for an important subset of climate scenarios, dramatically reduced return periods on
major flood events are expected in Mozambique by the 2040s. Chinowsky et al. (2013)
explore the implications of these changes for roads using a dedicated roads model
(CliRoad). As noted earlier, a version of this road model is incorporated directly into the
CGE model allowing for detailed accounting of growth in road stocks given budgets (modeled
3 Exact figures depend upon the weighting scheme employed for yields across crops and regions.
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as a fixed share of government expenditure) and the implications of climate changes for
maintenance and rehabilitation expenses. More specifically, the model contains stressor-
response functions for different road surfaces (e.g., paved and unpaved). These functions are
calibrated to Mozambique road and weather conditions, and convert heat stress, rainfall and
flooding into annual estimates of maintenance costs. If these costs rise relative to the baseline
then they displace investment in new roads leading to a shorter road network length over time.
Following Arndt et al. (2012), we assume in the CGE model that sector-specific produc-
tivity growth (excluding hydropower and aluminum production) is a function of the ratio of
road network length relative to the baseline. Previously, the square root of this ratio was taken;
however, this form has the undesirable property of reducing the marginal impact of strong
events. In addition, the CliRun and CliRoad modeling combination has been updated since
initial development in 2010 with generally less sensitivity to given climatic conditions
particularly at the extremes. As indicated in Chinowsky and Arndt (2012), no published ex
post studies of infrastructure damage following major flood events exist. Hence, it is most
practical to calibrate between historical data on climatic conditions and economic growth data,
both of which are available. For this analysis, a proportional relationship fits best. So, if the
rate of productivity growth in non-agricultural sectors is 2.6 % per annum in 2049 in the
baseline and the size of the road network in climate scenario i is projected to be 95 % of the
baseline in the roads model, then productivity growth in non-agricultural sectors in climate
scenario i in 2049 is assumed to be 2.6*.95=2.47 %.
3.4 Hydropower
Fant et al. (2013) also use river basin models to estimate annual streamflow at different points
along the Zambezi river for each climate scenario in the HFD. This is converted into annual
hydropower generation levels based on the capacity of existing and planned infrastructure. As
with the crop models, annual hydropower supply in each climate scenario is converted into
deviations from baseline. The CGE model disaggregates Mozambique’s electricity sector into
coal-fired plants, hydropower dams, and other sources. Deviations in hydropower supply are
imposed on baseline TFP levels in the model’s hydropower production function. Proportional
shocks are applied. If the hydropower modeling indicates that actual production in the year t is
95 % (105 %) of the baseline level due to decreased (increased) river flow, then hydropower
production is reduced (augmented) by the same proportion while input use remains constant.
3.5 Sea level rise and cyclones
Unlike all preceding shocks, sea level rise and cyclones are uniformly negative shocks for
growth and development. Sea level rise is assumed to reduce the area of arable land available
for production as coastal arable land becomes submerged, i.e., an unmitigated bad. Cyclones
are more complex but also uniformly negative (at least as modeled here). Neumann et al.
(2013) consider these impacts in detail. Briefly, sea level rise provides an advanced starting
point for the storm surges associated with cyclones, i.e., a physically higher platform that
allows storm surge to reach further inland and cause greater damages. As in Neumann et al.,
we assume that climate change does not increase (or decrease) the frequency or severity of
cyclone themselves. Instead, we focus on the marginal impact of storm surges from cyclones
due to sea level rise. The other effects of cyclones, such as wind damage, are assumed to be
constant between the climate change and no climate change scenarios.
Neumann et al. use a seeded cyclone generator and coastal storm surge model to estimate
the GDP losses associated with cyclones, as well as how these losses are amplified by rising
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sea levels. We convert the estimated GDP losses into percentage changes in capital stocks,
which, in the CGE model, are assumed to become immobile after investment. We impose
annual capital stock losses on the model based on a fixed set of randomly-drawn cyclones
events. Note that the same series of annual cyclone events is applied to all scenarios. Over
time, however, rising sea levels increases potential cyclone damages relative to the baseline
due to more pronounced inland storm surge.
4 Simulation results
We begin by focusing on changes to agricultural value added when only climate change
impacts on crop yields are considered (scenario Agriculture). Figure 1 shows the estimated
HFD of agricultural impacts when the definition of agriculture is restricted to crops and
livestock. The horizontal axis reports the percentage change in the average of value added
in agriculture over the period 2046–2050 relative to the baseline. We present a five-year
average because final-year results are more likely to reflect inter-annual weather variability
rather than long-term climate change. We initially focus on the final five years of our
simulation period so that the estimated losses include the cumulative effects of annual climate
shocks during all preceding years. The vertical axis in the figure reports the estimated density,
which is a measure of likelihood. The mode of the distribution centers around about a 4 %
decline in total agricultural value added. Declines of up to 10 % are possible. It is also possible,
but unlikely, that agricultural value added increases.
The second simulation scenario involves roads. Figure 2 uses the same graphical format to
consider road network length by decade. We elect to present the total effect on road network
length from the final scenario where all climate change impact channels considered are
included. In the 2010s, when very few climate change impacts are present, the median impact
on roads is actually marginally positive. However, the average or expected impact is almost
exactly zero due to the presence of a negative tail in the HFD. As time progresses, the mode of
the distribution shifts to the left, and the distribution also becomes progressively skewed to the
left. By the 2040s, the average length of the road network is always smaller than in the
Fig. 1 Value added in agriculture relative to the baseline for the Agriculture scenario, 2046–2050
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baseline. Strongly negative outcomes in terms of road network length are associated with
dramatic increases in the return periods for major flood events.
Figure 3 illustrates the implications of all shocks considered for total GDP at factor cost. As
noted, the effects are cumulative as climate impact channels are added and imposed in the
same order as presented in Section 3. The final Cyclone scenario includes all impact channels.
The horizontal axis reports the percentage change in the average of GDP at factor cost over the
period 2046–2050 relative to the baseline, and the vertical axis reports the density or measure
of likelihood.
The dark vertical dashed line shows the mean effect from the scenario Agriculture on total
value added (the HFD for the scenario Agriculture is omitted because of limited variation
around the mean). This impact is a bit more than 0.4 % of GDP, which is sensible given that
Fig. 2 Impacts on average road network length by decade for the final cumulative Cyclone scenario
Fig. 3 Percent deviation of GDP at factor cost relative to baseline, 2046–2050. The vertical dashed line
represents the mean impact of the agriculture scenario. Note: The Cyclone scenario depicts the cumulative effect
of all impact channels
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the impacts on agricultural value added alone are about 4 % and the agricultural share of GDP
is about 10 %.
The next effect modeled is roads. As Fig. 2 indicates, this is a major potential source of
impact. The effect of roads is to expand the range of potential impacts dramatically. The large
bulk (about 86 %) of potential outcomes, considering the combined effect of Agriculture and
Roads only, lie between about minus five percent and plus two percent of GDP. There are no
strongly positive outcomes; however, for the first time, strongly negative outcomes are
introduced with about 14 % of outcomes stronger than minus five percent of GDP and about
1.5 % of outcomes stronger than −10 % of GDP. So, while the expected impact of climate
change in the scenario Roads is not enormous at about −2.4 % of GDP, the road channel
substantially increases the range of potential outcomes.
Hydropower is the next impact channel added. As discussed in Fant et al. (2013), impacts
on hydropower in Mozambique are negative on average. The shape of the distribution of GDP
outcomes is largely similar to that of Roads but with a small shift to the left. The mean climate
change impact increases by not quite 0.3 % of GDP bringing the mean total impact up to about
−2.7 % of GDP.
As discussed above, the effects of sea level rise and cyclones are uniformly negative. The
distribution again shifts to the left by about 0.2 % of GDP for each effect. The expected loss of
GDP is thus about −3.1 % when all impact channels are included (e.g., the scenario Cyclones).
This mean disguises a great deal of information that the hybrid frequency distributions reveal.
As noted in the Introduction, impacts greater than 10 % of GDP in about 2050 are possible but
unlikely with about a 2.5 % probability of occurrence. The majority of outcomes, about 73 %,
lie within zero and five percent of GDP. The probability of positive GDP outcomes by 2050 is
small but non-negligible at slightly less than nine percent.
Overall, more than four out of five outcomes imply losses less than five percent of GDP.
In per capita terms, GDP losses of less than five percent by about 2050 imply a growth
delay of less than two years. In other words, if the economy is five percent smaller in 2050
as a result of climate change, the economy could be expected to attain the no climate
change level of per capita GDP sometime during 2052. Viewed through this optic, climate
change does not appear to exert a large influence at least out to 2050. However, in many
scenarios, the people of Mozambique, who are already among the poorest in the world, are
experiencing sustained losses for long periods as a result of climate change (even when the
analysis extends only to 2050).
These sustained losses can be captured via a calculation of the net present value (NPV) of
GDP losses using a 5 % discount rate. Table 2 shows the probability of falling into one of four
categories in terms of losses for each scenario as well as the mean loss by scenario. Overall, the
Table 2 Mean net present value of losses and probability of loss by category and scenario
Agriculture Roads Energy SLR Cyclone
Mean (2007 USD billion)a −1.19 −2.34 −3.42 −3.66 −3.85
Prob. loss >10 Billion 0.0 3.6 5.1 5.7 6.2
Prob. loss 5–10 Billion 0.0 12.3 24.4 26.4 28.0
Prob. loss 0–5 Billion 91.9 60.7 51.9 51.3 50.6
Prob. of gain 8.1 23.5 18.5 16.7 15.3
Scenarios are cumulative. The Cyclone scenario is the final one with all impact channels included
a Values are real 2007 USD and a discount rate of five percent is applied
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support of the distribution of the NPV of GDP changes imposed by climate change is very
wide running from a 15 billion USD loss to a five billion USD gain. The probability of a gain
in NPV terms, at about 15 %, is about six percentage points bigger than the probability of a
larger economy in 2050 (see Fig. 3). This occurs because climate change impacts may be
positive for an extended period before turning negative in the late 2040s. This compilation of
effects through time combined with the effect of discounting on later period losses explains the
increased probability of gain in NPV terms. While positive outcomes are present, the large
bulk of outcomes are negative with many of them strongly so. The probability that total losses
to 2050 will exceed five billion USD is more than one in three. The probability of losses
greater than 10 billion is about 6 %. Viewed in this way, the losses imposed by climate change
are significant.
Figure 4 presents the NPV of losses by decade for the final cumulative Cyclone scenario.
The graph points to progressively stronger impacts through time with the 2040s generating on
average the strongest climate change impacts in present value terms. As might be expected, the
variance of impacts also increases with time. The range of outcomes in the 2010s is small
relative to later decades. The distributions then become progressively wider culminating in the
distribution of possible outcomes in the 2040s, which is by far the widest. Recalling that the
baseline growth rate is very similar to the discount rate at about five percent, Fig. 4 illustrates
that climate change shocks are tending to become larger with time relative to the size of the
total economy.
Finally, we consider the sensitivity of our results to changes in the sectoral pattern of
baseline economic growth. We assumed that agriculture in the baseline declines in importance
with crops and livestock accounting for only 10 % of national GDP by 2050, down from 23 %
in 2007. As such, while Fig. 1 reported a 4 % decline in agricultural GDP at the mode of the
HFD, this translates into only a 0.4 % decline in total GDP by 2050. Had agriculture retained
its 23 % share of GDP throughout the baseline, then the mode of total GDP losses from
agriculture is only slightly larger at 0.5 %. Conversely, energy, roads and cyclones have larger
impacts on nonagricultural GDP and so by increasing the share of agriculture in baseline GDP
we reduce the nonagricultural GDP losses from these three channels. If agriculture’s share of





















Fig. 4 Net present value of GDP losses by decade for the cumulative impact (Cyclone) scenario
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smaller, i.e., the mode of the GDP losses for the final cumulative Cyclone scenario in Fig. 3 is
4.2 % instead of 4.7 %. From this we conclude that, while the baseline pattern of growth
influences measured impacts, our results are robust to a wide range of baseline assumptions.
5 Conclusions
The articles in this special issue take a probabilistic approach to assessing climate change risks
and vulnerabilities. This approach has at least three principal advantages. First, it provides a
much more comprehensive and useful picture for decision-makers. To date, analysts have been
forced to state that climate change impacts might be large, small, or even positive without any
formal mechanism for estimating the probability of a given outcome. For Mozambique, we
find that more than four out of five outcomes imply losses less than five percent of GDP
relative to a fictional no climate change baseline. Strongly negative outcomes, a reduction of
greater 10 % of GDP relative to baseline, are possible but unlikely (less than 2 % probability).
Nevertheless, consistent losses tend to be imposed resulting in a high probability of substantial
GDP losses in NPV terms.
Second, the probabilistic approach provides much more detailed insight into the
importance of various impact channels including the possibility of capturing interactions
between impact channels across the range of potential future climates. For Mozambique,
the flooding impact channel is the principal driver of variance in outcomes and the driver
of all strongly negative outcomes. This channel merits attention both in terms of current
policy and future research.
Finally, the probabilistic approach provides a more holistic and comprehensive approach
for evaluating adaptation options. Adaptation policy is constrained by uncertainties
concerning the exact nature of climate change. Most obviously, adoption of measures to
cope with a dryer future when a wetter future is possible risks not only wasting resources
but being counterproductive. The probabilistic approach applied here to Mozambique
highlights the importance of no regret, flexible and/or robust options as recommended by
Hallegatte (2009) among others.
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